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Focus Article
Interdisciplinarity as cognitive
integration: auditory verbal
hallucinations as a case study
Marco Bernini1∗ and Angela Woods2
In this article, we advocate a bottom-up direction for the methodological model-
ing of interdisciplinary research based on concrete interactions among individu-
als within interdisciplinary projects. Drawing on our experience in Hearing the
Voice (a cross-disciplinary project on auditory verbal hallucinations running at
Durham University), we focus on the dynamic if also problematic integration of
cognitive science (neuroscience, cognitive psychology, and of mind), phenomenol-
ogy, and humanistic disciplines (literature, narratology, history, and theology). We
propose a new model for disciplinary integration which brings to the fore an
under-investigated dynamic of interdisciplinary projects, namely their being pro-
cesses of distributed cognition and cognitive integration. © 2014 The Authors. WIREs
Cognitive Science published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
How to cite this article:
WIREs Cogn Sci 2014, 5:603–612. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1305
INTRODUCTION
In the last two decades interdisciplinary research hasbeen pursued with increasing vigor within universi-
ties, centers, and laboratories all over the globe. How-
ever, methodological reflections on interdisciplinary
research have not kept pace with this flourishing of
cross-disciplinary projects and agendas, and the artic-
ulation of a transferable methodology for interdisci-
plinary work remains the ‘great challenge’ (Ref 1, p.
18). In this article, we advocate a bottom-up direc-
tion (derived from and accounting for the interaction
of individuals) in methodological modeling. Instead
of assessing potential intersections in the theoretical
realms of each discipline we suggest that a model
for cross-disciplinary work should be derived from
(and embrace) concrete interactions among individ-
uals within interdisciplinary projects. By drawing on
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our experience in a cross-disciplinary project on audi-
tory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) running at Durham
University, we focus on the dynamic if also prob-
lematic integration of the cognitive sciences (neu-
roscience, cognitive psychology, and philosophy of
mind), phenomenology, and humanistic disciplines
(literature, narratology, history, and theology). In the
final section, we propose a new model for disciplinary
integration which adds depth and complexity to oth-
erwise flat, two-dimensional representations of disci-
plinary intersections. Importantly, this model brings
to the fore an under-investigated dynamic of inter-
disciplinary projects, namely their being processes of
distributed cognition and cognitive integration.2
CONCEPTUALIZING
INTERDISCIPLINARITY
Although in 1989 it was possible to dismiss interdisci-
plinarity as ‘the most seriously underthought critical,
pedagogical, and institutional concept in the modern
academy’ (Ref 3, p. 743), today it has a legitimate
place in research practice,4 policy,5 and as an object of
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scholarly inquiry.6–8 While some have argued for the
retention of broad, flexible, and even ‘slippery’ defini-
tions of the term (Ref 6, p. 14) Julie Klein’s9 taxonomy
outlines important distinctions between multi-, inter-,
and trans-disciplinarity as follows: multidisciplinary
approaches juxtapose knowledge, information, and
methodologies from different disciplines in compos-
ite, sometimes collaborative, configurations (however,
the disciplines ‘remain separate, disciplinary ele-
ments retain their original identity, and the existing
structure of knowledge is not questioned’); interdis-
ciplinary approaches emphasize integration as well as
interaction, effecting disciplinary transformation at
methodological as well as theoretical levels; finally, in
transdisciplinary approaches, research questions and
practices are framed by problems arising from the
life-world and addressed by academics in partnership
with other stakeholders.
Interdisciplinarity is a concept which is both
fraught and fashionable (Ref 10, p. 255). Critics
view interdisciplinary approaches as lacking in nov-
elty, scholarly depth, and methodological rigor, and
as espousing values and practices which serve the
increasingly neo-liberal, market-driven agendas of the
corporate University.11 Advocates argue that inter-
disciplinary approaches are essential to solving com-
plex real-world problems such as climate change or
poverty.8,12 In sharp opposition to those who would
uncritically celebrate interdisciplinarity as the dis-
mantling of disciplinary boundaries in the rapacious
pursuit of new knowledge, Robert Frodeman has
suggested that interdisciplinary research should be
conceptualized in environmental terms as research
which ‘recognizes limits—to people’s capacity for
understanding, to time and money, and to research
itself’ (Ref 13, p. 55).
The practical and institutional challenges of
conducting interdisciplinary research are many, rang-
ing from those located at the level of research funding
and evaluation12 through to the training and motiva-
tion of individual researchers.14–16 It is increasingly
recognized, however, that interdisciplinary case work
(i.e., specific projects which tackle real-world prob-
lems) has an important role to play in advancing our
capacity to understand and address these challenges
from a ‘bottom-up’ perspective.8,17 For this reason we
turn now to the analysis of an interdisciplinary project
based at Durham University in the UK: Hearing the
Voice (HtV).
HTV: A CASE STUDY IN
INTERDISCIPLINARITY
HtV is an ambitious interdisciplinary study of the
phenomenon of voice-hearing, or AVH, funded by a
3-year Wellcome Trust Strategic Award (2012–2015,
Charles Fernyhough, PI).a The core research team
of 18 Durham-based academics, ranging from
postgraduate to professorial level, have primary
disciplinary affiliations in the arts, neuroscience,
psychology, philosophy of mind, psychiatry, cultural
studies, geography, history, literary studies and the-
ology, and work with an extended research team
of clinicians, mental health advocates, and people
with lived experience of hearing voices. University
support for the project in material as well as concep-
tual terms has been strong: the majority of academic
researchers meet fortnightly at the Durham Institute
of Advanced Study and work in offices co-located with
the interdisciplinary Centre for Medical Humanities.
Despite the common misperception in clini-
cal and cultural contexts that AVHs are inherently
pathological (a hallmark symptom of schizophrenia,
itself a deeply contested category18) their phe-
nomenology is complex, heterogeneous, and not yet
well-understood.19,20 AVHs are reported in nonclini-
cal populations and by patients with a wide variety of
diagnoses, they are measured and investigated using
a range of empirical methods, as well as variously
interpreted and valued in people’s lives across cultures
and religious contexts, and as ‘talkative acts’ they
are symptoms or experiences which are distinctively
amenable to hermeneutic and linguistic analysis. For
these reasons, HtV integrates scientific and human-
ities approaches to voice-hearing to achieve two
high-level objectives. First, the project is pursuing
multiple interdisciplinary lines of inquiry to attain
a new holistic understanding of the phenomenon of
voice-hearing, examining its significance as an aspect
of personal narrative and as psychiatric symptom,
conducting empirical studies into its cognitive and
neuroscientific mechanisms, performing culturally
sensitive investigations of its personal, social, and his-
torical significance, and leading translational research
into its therapeutic management. By drawing on and
synthesizing multiple disciplinary perspectives and
methodologies, the project seeks to move beyond the
limitations inherent in approaching AVHs as discrete
objects abstracted from the wider context of human
experience or assigning biological psychiatry priority
in their explanation. The second high-level objective
is to develop a transferable methodology for interdis-
ciplinary research into human experience which can
be generalized to other areas of inquiry.
In addition to the project’s focus on AVH as a
central if under-examined aspect of human experience,
and explicit commitment to methodological reflection
and innovation, the distinctiveness of HtV as a case
study in interdisciplinarity can be identified in two
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further domains: recognition by the Wellcome Trust
as a leading project in the relatively new field of the
medical humanities,b21 and close engagement between
the humanities and social sciences, clinical disciplines,
and cognitive sciences.
INTERDISCIPLINARITY
AND THE COGNITIVE SCIENCES
If the historical separation of the humanities from the
‘hard’ sciences has been extensively theorized,22,23 the
peculiar status of the cognitive sciences with respect
to this division has only more recently come into
focus.24,25 What distinguishes the cognitive sciences is
not a reciprocal or even engagement with the human-
ities (if there is a ‘cognitive turn’ in the humanities,26
traces of a ‘humanistic turn’ in the cognitive sciences
are, with few exceptions,27 absent), but rather their
recruitment by disciplines such as literary studies,28
narratology,29,30 esthetics,31 or theology.32 While psy-
chology, phenomenology, and philosophy of mind
have exerted an influence on esthetic and cultural the-
ory for over a century, only recently have experimen-
tal cognitive disciplines stimulated in the humanities
such an array of enthusiasms, biases, and perplexi-
ties. Critiques of what has been termed ‘neuromania’33
are two-pronged. On the one hand, it is argued
that the proliferation of ‘neuro-labels’ (neuroaesthet-
ics, neurotheology, and cognitive narratology) is a
fashionable trend and signals no substantial inno-
vation on research hypotheses and outcomes that
could have been framed or obtained by already exist-
ing disciplines. On the other hand, there is a suspi-
cion concerning the methodological ground of these
new ‘interdisciplines’. To what extent should neuro-
scientific methods inform humanistic research? Is this
best conceptualized as a largely one-way interaction?
And if not, how can the explanatory and interpretive
toolkits of the humanities and social sciences mod-
ify the empirical and causal frameworks of cognitive
sciences?
Among the supporters of the importance of
the cognitive sciences for the esthetic field, Edward
Slingerland34 has suggested that the cognitive sciences
should provide a constraining function for human-
istic research. This ‘vertical integration’—according
to which hypotheses and method within the human-
ities should be vertically limited by what the cognitive
sciences say can be a testable truth—clearly assigns
a hierarchical priority to the scientific field. In what
follows we aim to provide a different definition of
disciplinary integration based on individuals’ interac-
tion in the HtV project; a definition which can fully
accommodate a mutual, more ‘horizontal’ exchange
of methods and hypothesis between the cognitive sci-
ences and humanities.
FROM DISCIPLINARY INTERSECTION
TO COGNITIVE INTEGRATION
Missing Factors in Current Taxonomies
As we have seen, Klein’s9 taxonomy of inter-
disciplinary research assigns to multi- and
interdisciplinarity a different degree of disciplinary
involvement and plasticity (or malleability of dis-
ciplinary boundaries). Through juxtaposition and
alignment, multidisciplinarity increases knowledge
through encyclopedic additions that leave unaltered
the contributing disciplines. The distinguishing feature
of a strong interdisciplinarity is instead the proac-
tive processes of interaction and integration. When
deep interdisciplinary takes place we have, in Burns’
terms (Ref 35, pp. 11–12), an explicit ‘focusing’ and
‘blending’ of approaches in which new questions
and/or methods emerge that were previously not
belonging to individual disciplines. As Klein explains,
integration can be partial or full, and its focus narrow
(as in between ‘disciplines with compatible methods,
paradigms, and epistemologies such as history or
literature’) or broad, as in cases where there is little
or no compatibility (Ref 9, p. 18).
By bringing together the cognitive sciences,
phenomenology, and the humanities, HtV exempli-
fies strong integration with a broad interdisciplinary
focus. However, in what follows we use the case
study of HtV to highlight aspects of interdisciplinar-
ity which are not accounted for by these taxonomies.
On the one hand, we want to counter the sort of static
description of interdisciplinary encounters, in which
the degree of interaction seems to be pre-established
and unchanging (time factor). On the other hand,
we want to advocate the importance of consider-
ing interdisciplinarity not (only) as a disembodied
interaction of disciplines on a theoretical level, but
as concrete processes involving individuals’ entangle-
ments in space and time (extended, embodied, and
enactive factors). To put it succinctly, what is miss-
ing from Klein’s categorization is a cognitive descrip-
tion of interdisciplinary research. We suggest that
looking at what cognitive sciences and cognitively
informed phenomenology say about distributed cog-
nition can and should profitably inform models of
interdisciplinary research, complementing sociological
and ethnographic approaches to the study of actors
and agents in contexts of scientific investigation.36–39
In so doing, we propose to complement the current
idea of strong interdisciplinary integration and inter-
action with a view of interdisciplinarity as a social
Volume 5, September/October 2014 © 2014 The Authors. WIREs Cognitive Science published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 605
Focus Article wires.wiley.com/cogsci
Therapeutic practice
Phenomenology
Cognitive
neuroscience Hermeneutics
WP3: Literary studies,
Narratology,
Cultural studies,
History, Theology
WP2: Classical and cognitively-oriented phenomenology
WP4: Clinical practice and arts-in-health
WP1: Cognitive psychology,
Developmental psychology,
Philosophy of mind,
cognitive neurosciences
Methodology
WP5
FIGURE 1 | Hearing the Voice: A Venn diagram showing intersections between the ﬁve project workpackages.
form of what Richard Menary has labeled ‘cognitive
integration’.2
The Limits of Intersection (Time Factor)
At the beginning of our project we started by visualiz-
ing the project’s four largely discipline-based and one
methodological workpackage through a classic Venn
diagram (Figure 1).
This diagram has proven to be an effective
heuristic tool for a preliminary project planning, and
for communicating key areas of research to funders
and others stakeholders. Yet, after the first year of
the project, its limitations have become clear. The
Venn diagram has its historical and disciplinary roots
in the mathematical branch of set theory. Loosely
speaking, its function is to display logical intersections
between classes (finite sets) of objects; its explanatory
potential therefore resides in assessing possible (but
already existing) relations between them. The prob-
lem in using Venn diagrams for the description of
interdisciplinary projects is twofold: first, disciplines
are not finite sets but historically evolving organisms
with uncertain boundaries; related to this is presen-
tation of relations between them as fixed and static
in time. To the extent that disciplines are not sim-
ply aligned, but not yet dynamically integrating and
interacting, the Venn diagram appears to describe, in
Klein’s taxonomy, something in between multidisci-
plinarity and interdisciplinarity. The plasticity of each
discipline, which is a necessary condition for a proper
integration, requires and occurs in time, a factor that is
completely absent from this model of intersection. In
the case of HtV, the Venn diagram is unable to capture
the disciplinary interrogation and (re)definition, con-
ceptual exchanges, emergent alliances, and problem-
atic frictions of the project’s first year. The time factor
in disciplinary plasticity is not the only dynamic aspect
missing from intersecting and taxonomical models.
Relatedly and, we argue, more importantly, disci-
plines are always considered as disembodied entities
with definite boundaries. Our view is that dynamic
processes of integration and interaction must take
account of the fact that individuals are the bearers and
beholders of knowledge and methods. Prioritizing the
embodied and social components of interdisciplinar-
ity projects, we propose an account of disciplinary
encounters in terms of extended40,41 and enactive42,43
cognition.
The Limits of Theoretical Integration
(Extended, Embodied, and Enactive Factors)
In referring to the mutual ‘cannibalization’ of theories
and their unsystematic incorporation of sometimes
conflicting claims, Jacques Derrida defined theories
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as ‘monsters’.44 This monstrosity can be detected
also in disciplinary umbrella terms such as ‘liter-
ary studies’, ‘medical humanities’, and ‘cognitive sci-
ences’. So varied are its contributing disciplines, and
so heterogeneous are its approaches, that to treat
the field of ‘cognitive sciences’ as a unitary agent
in the interdisciplinary exchange is problematic, to
say the least. The habit of speaking of disciplines as
unified agents relates to our functional tendency to
simplify and to anthropomorphize. But if disciplines
are not individual, they are embodied in (and their
existence and development rely on) individual human
agents. Instead of approaching interdisciplinarity in
the abstract terms of a theoretical integration, we pro-
pose to ground analysis in the actual interaction of
what we can call individuals’ disciplinary minds. This
methodological turnaround, from a top-down catego-
rization of interdisciplinarity to a bottom-up account,
complements formulations of disciplinary actors and
agents within science and technology studies, and has
two important benefits. First, it reconceptualizes the
abstract problem of disciplinary boundaries in terms
of the boundaries of human minds and in terms thus
amenable to cognitive inquiry. Secondly, by drawing
on contemporary accounts of extended, embodied,
and enactive cognition, it enables us to understand
the ‘unbounding’2 of disciplinary minds in interdisci-
plinary projects.
Cognitive sciences now strongly challenge the
Cartesian idea that cognition is something that hap-
pens just ‘in the head’.45 According to this new
framework in the science of the mind,46 cognitive pro-
cesses are instead partially extending into the world
through the interaction with the environment and
cognitive tools.40 The extended mind (EM) thesis
assumes that the boundaries of the mind (the con-
ceptual edges underlying the opposition of internal
versus external space) become under certain con-
ditions ‘porous’.47 This porosity takes place when
the mind interacts, manipulates and exploits exter-
nal tools; when the mind couples with these exter-
nalities and constituting what EM theorists call a
‘coupled system’. By drawing on recent expansions
of this thesis into the social domain,48,49 in the next
section, we want to suggest that, once we consider
interdisciplinarity as the embodied and enactive inter-
action of individuals (shortly, as a human cognitive
process) the same ‘porosity’ is activated in what we
called ‘disciplinary minds’. Furthermore, we propose
a model that accommodates the same causal reci-
procity and agency distribution between disciplinary
minds that the EM thesis attributes to the mind–world
interaction.
BLUEPRINT FOR A WE-SPACE:
TOWARD A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY
COGNITIVE INTEGRATION
Twomain principles guide the EM thesis, according to
which the mind extends into the world by interacting
with cognitive tools. The first concerns the hierarchi-
cal cognitive relation of the two poles involved in the
interaction and it is referred to as the ‘parity princi-
ple’. This principle implies that both poles have an
equal cognitive status, for when the mind is coupled
with a part of the world ‘that part of the world is
(so we claim) part of the cognitive process’ (Ref 45,
p. 29). The second principle is about the causal func-
tioning within a coupled system, which is described
as a ‘continuous reciprocal causation’ (CRC). This
principle is about reciprocity between the parts, and
it occurs ‘when some system S is both continuously
affecting and simultaneously being affected by, activity
in some other system O’.40 To put the two principles
together, when the mind interacts with specific exter-
nalities couple systems are activated, and within these
systems amutual horizontal two-ways affection is gen-
erated. Neither of the parts (the mind and the worldly
component) remains untouched due to the activation
of ‘inextricable tangles of feedback, feedforward, and
feedaround loops that promiscuously criss-cross the
boundaries of brain, body, and the world’ (Ref 47, p.
277). In terms of cognitive enhancement of thinking
and performing, this extension, the EM claims, ‘make
possible or fosters forms of thought which were pre-
viously difficult or impossible’ (Ref 2, p. 622 and Ref
50, p. 103).
EM thesis explicitly limits the rank of cognitive
tools enabling this activation of loops to technolo-
gies (broadly intended, from computers to writing),
but recently this thesis has been tentatively applied
also to social cognition—an application that appears
particularly warranted if viewed in relation to earlier
social theories of cognition such as Vygotsky’s.51–53
For instance, Shaun Gallagher’s idea of a socially EM
‘builds on the enactive idea of social affordances. Just
as a notebook or a hand-piece of technology may be
viewed as affording a way to enhance or extend our
mental possibilities, so our encounters with others,
especially in the context of various institutional proce-
dures and social practices may structures that support
and extend our cognitive abilities’.48 Similarly, Joel
Krueger has argued that ‘social cognition is a kind of
extended cognition’, and that it ‘is fundamentally an
interactive form of space management—the negotia-
tion and management of a “we-space”’ (Ref 49, p.
643). We think this shift regarding a social applica-
tion of the EM’s tenets provides solid ground for a
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FIGURE 2 | Blueprint of Hearing the Voice. With the contributing disciplines in the angular dimensions and different research questions in the
radial axes. (Adapted and modiﬁed from Varela, Thompson and Rosch 1991)
further tweak, i.e., the application of the EM to the
social interaction of disciplinary minds. By adapting a
model, Varela, Thompson, and Rosch used to visual-
ize the different approaches within cognitive sciences
in their foundational work about enactive cognition.42
We propose the following model as a better account of
interdisciplinary enhancing loops and cognitive inte-
gration in the HtV project (Figure 2).
We called this a ‘blueprint model’ because it
can actually be transformed into a physical building.
Even without this concretizing operation, however,
the model is not entirely conceptual and metaphor-
ical. In HtV, we do have a central meeting space,
a social ‘we-space’ constituted by a physical room
where we have our fortnight meetings (‘Voice Club’)
structured and facilitated by artist Mary Robson.
The concentric circles emanating from this physical
‘we-space’ are the ever-changing research questions
generated within it. Touching on every discipline in the
project, these questions open up specific, temporally
contingent spaces in which individual researchers
interact. The model accommodates two temporal
dimensions: synchronic entanglements (in the imme-
diate ‘we-space’ of ‘Voice Club’), as well as the
diachronic or longer-term entanglements emerging
from prolonged engagements as participants move
together in a common problem space, slowly adjust-
ing to—and integrating with—other disciplines’ ways
of thinking, speaking, and framing problems.c
Two criteria guide the disposition of disciplines
in the angular dimensions—read clockwise they show
(1) a contiguity of methods and research topics and
(2) a major toward minor reliance on empirical exper-
imental data. In this respect, phenomenology is sig-
nificantly a boundary discipline between the scientific
and humanistic semi-circles. The radial axes are gener-
ated by different research questions and hence change
throughout the project. This model could be easily be
manipulated and modified to accommodate a larger or
smaller numbers of disciplines and research questions,
but our illustration focuses on three aspects of AVH
to which all disciplines are called to contribute: (RQ1)
the relationship between inner speech and AVHs (dis-
cussed in more detail below); (RQ2) the degree to
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which voice-hearers’ recognize their voices as agents
over which they have various degrees of control; and
(RQ3) the developmental trajectory of AVH across
the lifespan. Black dots are people involved in the
project, or what we have called ‘disciplinary minds’.
The model makes clear that people are not just posi-
tioned by their main discipline of expertise, but can be
located in a greater or less proximity to the contigu-
ous field. Furthermore, along the project their location
can vary both in the angular dimension and radial
axis, following their role in the new research ques-
tions (that can be virtually endlessly expanded) and
their disciplinary polarization for those specific top-
ics. Another important aspect to underline is that the
concentric circles are all dashed, emphasizing move-
ment and exchange including with actors ‘outside’ the
project, and avoiding a hierarchical orientation of the
model in terms of center versus periphery.
Although subgroups form and interact through-
out the project space, the central physical we-space
of ‘Voice Club’ offers the starkest presentation of
the interdisciplinary project as a cognitively inte-
grated system of extended disciplinary minds. This is
the space in which all the disciplinary minds inter-
act; interactions which activate what we might call
‘enhancing loops’ (feedback loops which produce
cognitive enhancement, i.e., they disclose theoretical
and/or testable hypotheses previously unthinkable by
a single disciplinary mind) These include:
• Intuition Pumps: In Dennett’s terms, intuition
pumps are tools which stimulate specific kinds
of thinking. These ‘imagination extenders’ and
‘focus holders’ (Ref 54, p. 2) are present in
each discipline (and disciplinary mind), from
the philosophical Plato’s cave to the literary
Aesop’s short stories. In disciplinary cognitive
integration, though, new intuition pumps can
be generated and previous pumpers empowered
or manipulated by interacting with other disci-
plinary minds.
• Front Loading: Shaun Gallagher’s55 call
for insights from phenomenology to be
‘front-loaded’ into the design of cognitive
sciences experiments need not be limited to a
single discipline, as we have argued elsewhere.20
In the case of HtV, what to load and how has
been the subject of two ‘neurohackathons’ in
which humanities researchers have participated
directly in experimental design. Furthermore,
front-loading should not be considered a
one-way process. In looping, each discipline
can be loaded by and load insights that will be
mutually affecting.
• Terminological Negotiations: Each discipline has
different words for describing a similar concept,
or the same word signifying completely different
meanings. The negotiation of terminology, how-
ever, is more than looking for existing intersec-
tion. As with all the processes we are describing,
this can generate loops leading to unexpected ter-
minological and conceptual innovations.
• Enactive Constraining: Interdisciplinarity is not
an intellectual performance, an application of
knowledge. In the enactivist terms, is not a form
of ‘knowing-that’ (propositional knowledge) but
a form of ‘know-how’ (enactive exploration).56
Disciplinary minds discover in the interaction
and extension with other minds what is possi-
ble to do and what is not. There is a mutual
constraining or, in Gallagher’s words, each disci-
plinary mind provides a specific and limited kind
of affordance.
• Emergent Properties: The phenomenon to be
investigated and explored by interdisciplinary
projects (in our case, AVHs) has probably already
distinct features and properties in many dis-
cipline involved. The coupled interdisciplinary
extension of disciplinary minds allows the emer-
gence of unpredicted (and, according to the nov-
elty typical of a proper cognitive integration,
unpredictable) properties.
• Constructive Failures: Failures are rarely in the
spotlight of interdisciplinary debate, but we
regard them as telling signs of resisting integra-
tions. Understanding why feedbacks loops are
not generated or the reasons for the impossi-
bility of front-loading experimental designs is a
constructive form of enactive disciplinary explo-
ration. These failures, in fact, affect further inter-
actions as well as successful integrations.
This is a partial list of the kind of activi-
ties creating/generated by enhancing loops within the
project. Among the several examples we are col-
lecting throughout the project, we can briefly refer
to the interaction of disciplinary minds in address-
ing (RQ1) the relationship between inner speech
and AVHs. Together with the formal presentation of
existing research in psychology and philosophy,57–59
we have conducted close reading and narratological
analyses of the varieties of inner speech in literary
texts by Samuel Beckett and Hilary Mantel; in-depth
discussion in small groups of the scales and measures
used to investigate inner experience, and the subse-
quent development and implementation of new tools
for phenomenological research; and simulation of the
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meditative practices used by monks in the middle ages
to quiet turbulent inner voices.We have also used these
investigations to cast, confront and reciprocally con-
strain hypotheses for empirical research (phenomeno-
logical questionnaires and fMRI studies) While the
findings and quantifiable outputs of many these entan-
glements (which began in late 2012) have yet to be
published, their effects are evident in the questions and
directions now being explored by researchers within
the project, as well as in the qualitative data gathered
through formal and informal evaluations of ‘Voice
Club’.
Although not an exhaustive list, the enhancing
loops at operation within HtV all function to produce
thoughts and outcomes that, as the EM thesis indi-
cates, were unthinkable or unpredictable before, even
if subtly so. All these cognitive practices between dis-
ciplinary minds follow a horizontal ‘parity principle’
and loops of ‘CRC’; every interaction is at the same
time a coupled system in itself and part of the larger
cognitive system, which is the project as a whole. The
model, then, allows us to trace the holistic under-
standing of a phenomenon at issue (AVHs) by por-
traying the cognitive unity of the project as a whole as
well as the small-scale integrated and integrating cou-
ple systems constituted by individuals’ interactions. It
also allows us to grasp the complexity of potential
what Fitzgerald and Callard have termed ‘experimen-
tal entanglements’.60 ‘To be entangled’, they write, ‘is
precisely not simply to labour together, or to com-
pare – or engage in “dialogue” about – our different
disciplinary perspectives. It is to proceed, instead, on
the assumption that entanglements – of bodies, episte-
mologies, apparatuses, elements of experimental sys-
tems, operationalizations of terms – might produce
something new in the world, even as the forms that
that newness might take are undecided, and undecid-
able, prior to the moments of experimentation’.60
CONCLUSION
Whether in Kant’s call to view every science ‘as a
separate and independent building… a self-subsisting
whole’ (Ref 61, p. 31), Becher’s discussion of dis-
ciplinary incursion as hostile colonial encounter,62
or Docherty’s fear that interdisciplinarity lets ‘our
disciplines overflow into each other like anarchic
lava lamps’63 spatial and particularly architectural
metaphors have dominated the conceptualization
of disciplinary distinction and interdisciplinary
integration. In this article, we offered an account of
interdisciplinarity as a form of cognitive integration
grounded in an analysis of the HtV project. The model
(or spatial metaphor) we proposed allows us to (1)
move from an idea of ‘vertical integration’ to hor-
izontal nonhierarchical interactions; (2) reintegrate
the extended, embodied, and enactive factors of inter-
disciplinarity by focusing on individual disciplinary
agents; (3) treat interdisciplinary as cognitive process
of socially extended ‘disciplinary minds’; (4) better
represent the dynamic temporal and spatial dimen-
sions of interdisciplinary research (the position and
relation of disciplinary minds will change with each
new research question). In essence, the model puts the
onus on the cognitive dynamics among individuals
engaged in interdisciplinary projects, and therefore
can be consistently applied also to other projects even
when cognitive sciences are not involved.
We believe that this cognitive account of inter-
disciplinarity has great potential for further develop-
ment in at least two directions. First, we have not
accounted here for the emotional dimensions of social
cognition, or the training, motivation, skills, attitudes,
and even ‘virtues’ (Ref 13, p. 34) which play a role in
interdisciplinary research. Second, our model does not
yet capture the transdisciplinary modes of engagement
that characterize critical medical humanities research.
What new enhancing loops are created when nonaca-
demic partners—clinicians and voice-hearers—enter
and navigate these spaces? What happens when dis-
ciplinary minds venture into undisciplined territories
outside the academy13? Shifting the debate on inter-
disciplinarity from a disembodied abstract level to an
account of its extended, embodied, and enactive pro-
cesses discloses a complexity which calls for more
sophisticated models. Our article provides the ground
for future advances in this direction.
NOTES
a Further details are available from the project web
site: https://www.dur.ac.uk/hearingthevoice/.
b Tracing its roots to medical education and bioethics,
the medical humanities has traditionally referred to
the use of ideas andmethods from the arts and human-
ities to ‘rehumanise’ healthcare. More recently, and
particularly in the UK, the idea that the humani-
ties are supplementary, but ultimately peripheral to
medicine has been challenged, and themedical human-
ities have developed into a vibrant interdisciplinary
research field exploring the social, historical, and cul-
tural dimensions of scientific knowledge, clinical prac-
tice, patient experience, and health policy. As the first
medical humanities project to receive Strategic Award
funding in open competition with the biomedical sci-
ences, the HtV project can be seen to reflect emerg-
ing perceptions of what the Wellcome Trust regard
as cutting-edge research in this field, namely (1) a
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transdisciplinary engagement with patients and clini-
cians, which is predicated on (2) a robust commitment
to broad interdisciplinarity (reciprocal exchange and
integration between disciplines with little recognized
compatibility, like medieval history and cognitive neu-
roscience).
c We are grateful to Joel Krueger for this insight.
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